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We develop a simple model of the effects of reputation on wine prices. 
An increasing fraction of consumers who are “naïve” (less well informed 
about wine quality) results in a stronger sensitivity of wine prices to rat-
ings of quality. We then use data on prices and Robert Parker’s ratings of 
wines, to show that prices have become more related to Parker ratings 
over time. In addition, we find that a change in Parker rating has a 








                                                      
1 This paper benefited from comments from participants at the “Competitive Forces Affecting the Wine and 
Winegrape Industries: An International Conference on World Wine Markets”, UC Davis, California, August 8-11, 
2007 and the AAWE conference, Portland OR, August 2008. The usual disclaimer applies.  
Globalization, Superstars, and the Importance of Reputation: 
Theory & Evidence from the Wine Industry 
 
Michael Gibbs, Mikel Tapia, & Frederic Warzynski 
Introduction 
Every bottle of wine is different. That is true for a collection of bottles of the same wine (region, 
vintner and vintage), but even more so across types of wine. Subtle differences in terroir, weather, har-
vesting, production, blending and aging can cause important differences in the quality of wine. There are 
also a large number of vintners. These product traits make assessment of the quality of a bottle of wine 
very difficult for consumers. For this reason, wine prices may reflect reputation. That reputation may be 
based in part on the region, in part on the vintner, or in part on the recommendations of wine experts such 
as Robert Parker. Reputation and wine ratings are especially important for less experienced buyers, who 
know less about specific regions, vintners, vintages, etc. For these reasons, the wine market is an interest-
ing one in which to empirically explore the economics of reputation. 
Globalization has increased the demand for fine wine worldwide. The best wines now have strong 
markets in Moscow, Beijing, or Sao Paolo. However, many buyers in new markets have less experience 
with wine than do buyers in more mature markets. This suggests that a greater proportion of buyers of 
fine wine may rely heavily on published wine ratings, especially those of Robert Parker. If so, then wine 
prices would be more strongly related to wine ratings, particularly for the highest quality wines. In addi-
tion, less experienced wine consumers would be more likely to respond to new information, such as a 
chance in wine ratings. In this paper, we explore these issues. 
We first present a simple model of the pricing of wine based on reputation. There are two types of 
consumers, naïve and sophisticated. Naïve consumers have less precise estimates of the quality of a given 
bottle of wine. For this reason, they rely more on outside reputational information, such as Parker ratings. 
The equilibrium price of wine then depends on the proportion of consumers who are naïve or sophisti-3 
 
cated, among other variables. The greater the proportion of buyers who are naïve, the greater the reliance 
on published ratings. In addition, relatively more naïve buyers implies that wine prices become more sen-
sitive to new information (a change in rating). We argue that these dynamics are likely to be reflected in 
the current wine industry, as globalization brings new and relatively naïve buyers into the market. 
We then test these ideas using data on Parker ratings and wine prices from a sample of red wines 
from France, Spain and California. We show that the relationship between prices and Parker ratings has 
increased over time, especially for the highest quality wines. We also show that the price elasticity of fine 
wines with respect to Parker ratings has increased over time. 
Model 
In this section we present a simple model of the effects of different types of consumers on wine 
prices. Naïve consumers are less informed about wine quality than sophisticated consumers. For this rea-
son, they respond more strongly to wine rankings, and to changes in those rankings – rankings are more 
informative to less informed consumers. 
Wine is of uncertain quality. The only two attributes that consumers care about are the mean and 
variance of this quality, μ and σ². Consumers have a private taste for wine, based on their utility and 
budget, distributed   ~ U[–t, +t]. They are also risk averse, with coefficient of absolute risk aversion r. 
Buyers are willing to pay more for a wine with better reputation μ. To capture these ideas, assume that the 
maximum amount a buyer is willing to pay for a bottle of wine is   + μ – ½rσ². 
Assume two types of consumers, naïve and sophisticated. Of the total population N, a fraction η 
are naïve. Naïve and sophisticated consumers are identical in all respects but one: they differ in the preci-
sion (variance) of their estimates of wine quality, with σ²N > σ²S. Thus, they have the same risk aversion, 
distribution of tastes for wine, and mean assessment of the quality of a given bottle of wine. We use this 
simple form to highlight the role played by uncertainty (σ²) about the quality of wine. Note that these as-4 
 
sumptions imply that a naïve consumer is less likely to buy a given wine than is a sophisticated consumer, 
because of their greater risk. Naïve consumers who buy a given wine will have higher average taste for 
wine than will sophisticated consumers who buy that same wine. 
Consider the pricing of a specific type of wine, with supply B bottles. Supply is fixed to capture 
the fact that a specific type of wine (region, grape, etc.) has very inelastic supply even in the long run. 
Price P clears the market, with supply equal to total demand by naïve and sophisticated consumers (Pr(·) 
means probability): 
 
In the last line we assume for simplicity that the equilibrium price is such that P – μ + ½σ²N,S fall 
within the bounds of [–t, +t] of the distribution of τ. Some algebra yields the equilibrium price: 
(1)    
We are now in a position to state our predictions (some of which are not testable with our data, 
but could be with other data). Wine prices are rising in average quality, all else equal. They are declining 
in the scarcity of the wine (B/N), while increasing in the overall population N. They are declining in risk 
aversion and the degree of uncertainty that sophisticated consumers have about the particular wine. 
Holding the overall population N constant, wine prices are declining in the proportion of consum-
ers who are naïve. This is because naïve consumers require a larger risk premium (lower price) in order to 
consume wine, as they have less precise estimates of quality than do sophisticated consumers. It is likely 
that globalization has led to increases in prices of fine wines. If so, according to our model that would be 
driven by greater total demand, though mitigated by a higher proportion of naïve consumers. Finally, 
wine prices decline in the degree of additional uncertainty that naïve consumers have about the wine 
compared to sophisticated consumers. This suggests that over time, as new consumers become more ex-5 
 
perienced with fine wine, the market should gradually move toward one that is more like the market prior 
to globalization (unless substantial additional naïve consumers keep entering the market as globalization 
moves to new regions). 
The Effect of Wine Ratings 
What about the effect of new information on the reputation, and hence price, of wines? Assume 
that a wine may receive a new rating (e.g., from Robert Parker). Standard Bayesian updating implies that 
naïve consumers update their prior about the wine more strongly than do sophisticated consumers, and 
that their confidence in their estimate of quality rises (variance falls). In other words, if a wine receives a 
new favorable rating, this should increase μ, decrease σ²S, and decrease σ²N even more. To model this sit-
uation in a simple way, assume a wine rating W, where W > 0 means that the wine’s appraisal has in-
creased (or it has received its first positive review), and W < 0 means the opposite. Assume that dμ/dW > 
0, and dσ²N/dW < dσ²S/dW < 0. From these and (1) it follows (not surprisingly) that a wine’s price rises if 




In other words, the greater the fraction of naïve consumers, the greater the effect of a change in rating on 
the price of the wine. The intuition for this should be clear: naïve consumers have relatively diffuse pri-
ors, so they give new information greater weight than do sophisticated consumers. 
This implication is relevant for thinking about the effects of globalization on wine pricing. Glob-
alization brings new consumers, and these new consumers are by and large “naïve.” The proportion of 
wine drinkers who are relatively uninformed about wine quality is likely to have grown very rapidly, es-6 
 
pecially as consumption of wine increases rapidly outside of Europe, to the US, Asia and so forth. Every 
year in the last decade or so, it is quite likely that the fraction of naïve wine consumers has grown. 
Our model does not predict a separate effect of total growth in consumers on the effect of Parker 
ratings, due to the simple functional forms that we assume (where the fraction of naïve and sophisticated 
consumers drives our predictions, and where marginal utility of wine quality is constant). It is likely in 
practice that growth in the total market for wine will lead to greater sensitivity of price to reputation / rat-
ing. The reason for this is that, more realistically, consumers might have increasing marginal utility for 
wine quality. Growth in absolute numbers of consumers would then mean that those who buy a better 
quality wine have higher average marginal utility from that wine – the equilibrium price sweeps an in-
creasingly smaller fraction of the right tale of the consumer taste distribution τ. 
The fraction of sophisticated wine consumers has been high in Europe for a long time. In the 
United States, wine consumption and production has risen for many years, so it is plausible that the frac-
tion of sophisticated consumers is rising there. However, wine is traded internationally. Wine already on 
one continent is unlikely to be shipped to another continent to arbitrage price differences, but wine pro-
ducers face the tradeoff each year of shipping their product to different economies for sale. Therefore, 
they will respond when, say, demand in China rises relative to demand in France. For this reason it seems 
likely that the fraction of naïve consumers worldwide will affect the relative price of various wines, and 
how they respond to Parker notes or other wine ratings. This seems especially so for better quality wines, 
which are more likely to be shipped overseas (shipping costs will be a smaller fraction of total value). 
That said, it would be interesting to see if wine prices are more sensitive to ratings in countries where 
wine consumption has grown more rapidly. Unfortunately, our data do not allow such a test. 
Our model is a simple one of pricing based on a wine’s reputation to consumers. Rosen’s super-
stars model (1981) would yield similar implication. For example, he notes that imperfect substitution be-
tween quality-differentiated products implies convexity in a consumer’s value of a good as function of 
quality. He similarly argues that some goods have a public good aspect of joint consumption. It is possi-
ble that this is true for high quality wines, due to either literally sharing a good bottle with friends, or to 7 
 
“snob effects.” We have ignored these possibilities by assuming that willingness to pay for wine is linear 
in μ. Such effects would only increase the importance of quality, and signals about quality such as wine 
ratings, for pricing. Thus, they would reinforce our predictions. 
Data 
We extracted the information available on the website eRobertParker.com regarding all the tast-
ing notes from Robert Parker for Californian, Spanish and Bordeaux wines. The data were collected dur-
ing the fall of 2006 and spring of 2007. We use 15 vintages of data (1990-2004). These tasting notes were 
published in the Wine Advocate or in books written by Robert Parker. Table 1 shows the number of ob-
servations by “regions” as defined by Robert Parker. We know the tasting date (month, year), the Parker 
note, the name of the wine, the vintage, the region, the average quality of the vintage for the year, and we 
also have an estimated cost of the wine in the U.S. for most wines. We can therefore run some regressions 
of the price over ratings as repeated cross-sections and then look at the evolution of the sensitivity
2. An 
interesting feature of the data for our purposes is that Parker sometimes tastes the same wine from the 
same vintage more than once, so that we can observe the dynamic effect of a change in opinion. We are 
also interested in differences of wines from the same vineyard but with vintages of different years and 
rated differently by Parker. 
Tables 1a,b and 2 provide summary statistics. We have 9,410 observations, on vintages from 
1970 through 2004, rated and priced from 1992 through 2006. Age is the year of the Parker points and 
price data, minus the vintage; it is the age of the bottle of wine. For virtually all observations, the data 
include Parker points, ranging from 64 to 100, and an estimate of the price in the US, ranging from $2 to 
$1,295 per bottle (prices are converted to 2006 dollars using the year-average CPI for all consumers). 
                                                      
2 Unfortunately, this measure of price does not fully capture the dynamic adaptation of prices following 
new information. Therefore, we also used a panel of prices of Bordeaux wines from one of the main brokers in Bor-
deaux. The dataset provides “en primeur” and spot prices for 254 châteaux (estates) over 16 vintages, starting in 
1982 (this dataset is well known and used quite extensively in the wine economics literature, see e.g. the updated 
version in Hadj Ali et al., 2008). Spot prices are available quarterly for a period of 4 years, from July 1996 to De-
cember 2000. We found qualitatively similar results. See Tapia and Warzynski (2006). 8 
 
Many wines were rated more than once (in some cases, more than twice). Therefore, roughly one third of 
the observations, over 3,000, are updated points and prices. 
In some analyses we will use a baseline measure of “reputation” of the wine. We explored vari-
ous measures, but the one that we use here is the number of times a vineyard has received a Parker note 
above 90. Therefore, we use two potential measures of the quality of the wine that might be relevant for 
consumers: past reputation and current performance. 
Results 
Effects of Quality Indicators on Price: Repeated Cross-Section 
Table 3 presents regressions analyzing the relationship between price and various measures of 
quality: age of the wine; reputation; and Parker points. We use natural logs of price, reputation and points 
in all analyses and plots. 
The first panel regressions ln(Price) on the three available measures of quality. For ln(Points) and 
ln(Reputation), the coefficients can be interpreted as estimates of price elasticities. The most interesting 
results in the first panel are the effects of reputation and Parker points. The effects of Parker points are 
striking. They are very strongly related to price; indeed the elasticity is estimated to be about 7. This ef-
fect diminishes when we control for reputation and age of the wine. In fact, we observe that all three 
measures are positively related to the price of the wine, suggesting that both current performance and past 
reputation. However, our model suggested that there might be an interaction between these two measures. 
We get back to this question later in our analysis.  
The second panel examines the effect of changes in Parker points on changes in the price of wine. 
Not surprisingly, we find a similar effect: as a wine’s rating changes, its price tends to change strongly in 
the same direction. 9 
 
Trends in Effects of Quality on Price 
Figures 1-4 build on this basic analysis by asking whether the relationship between price and 
measures of wine quality has changed over time. For these figures, regressions similar to those in Table 3 
were run separately for each year and regional group indicated. Those regressions had either ln(Price) or 
the change in ln(Price) as the dependent variable. In all cases regressions controlled for age and age².  
Figure 1 shows how the price elasticity of region reputation evolved over time. In this plot we are 
able to show California and French wines separately. We observe a very clear upward trend over time in 
the effects of reputation on wine prices in both regions and for the sample as a whole. This figure indi-
cates that reputation has a much stronger effect on wine prices in 2006 than it did in 1993. 
A similar conclusion emerges in Figure 2, which shows how the price elasticity of Parker points 
evolved over time (here we also include Spain despite the fact that we have less observations than for the 
other regions). In all four series, there is a notable positive trend over time since the beginning of the sam-
ple. However, there is some suggestion that the effect of Parker points may have begun to decline in the 
last few years for California wines at least. It is difficult to say without additional data. Nevertheless, the 
long term trends are quite clear. 
These two figures provide strong (suggestive) support for our prediction that indicators of the 
reputation of the wine will have stronger effects over time due to globalization. It is striking to see how 
much the effects of reputation and Parker points have on wine over time. 
Figure 3 analyzes the effects of a change in Parker points on the change in the wine’s price, using 
region-year regressions similar to those employed for Figures 1-3. The incremental effect of a change in 




Effects of Points on Price for Wines of Different Reputations 
We now turn to our final prediction, that wines with higher reputations will exhibit stronger ef-
fects of Parker ratings on price than will wines with lower reputations. To study this, we divided the sam-
ple into three groups. Wines with no previous measure of reputation, i.e. no Parker notes at least equal to 
91 were classified as in the “Low” reputation group (41.7% of the sample). Those with less than 10 
Parker notes higher than 90 were put in the “Medium” reputation group (43.6% of the sample). Finally, 
wines with more than 10 observations above 90 were classified as in the “High” reputation group (14.7% 
of the sample). 
Table 4 repeats regressions of changes in ln(Price) on changes in ln(Points) and a quadratic for 
age, but divided into the three reputational groups. The only variable that matters consistently is the 
change in ln(Points). This variable is always highly significant, confirming once again the importance of 
Parker points for wine prices. Most importantly, however, this variable’s coefficient rises dramatically 
from the Low through High reputational categories (and is significantly different when comparing across 
regressions). Parker point changes do not have strong effects on lower quality wines, but do have large 
effects on Medium quality wines. They have even stronger effects still on the highest quality wines. 
Our final test looks at the evolution of these parameters over time (Table 5). We notice that the 
sensitivity increases over time for all three groups. We might have suspected that sensitivity would in-
crease faster in the segment with high reputation than in other segments. This does not appear to be the 
case. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we developed a simple model of reputation in which some buyers are naïve and 
some are more sophisticated. Naïve buyers have greater uncertainty about the quality of wine. This means 
that equilibrium wine prices depend, in part, on the proportion of naïve buyers and their relative lack of 
confidence in their estimates of wine quality. In addition, wine prices are more sensitive to ratings of 11 
 
quality such as Parker notes, the greater the proportion of consumers who are naïve. We use this model to 
make predictions about the effects of globalization on wine prices over the last two decades, under the 
reasonable assumption that globalization has increased the fraction of buyers who are “naïve” about wine 
quality. 
We then presented preliminary evidence on these predictions using data from eParker.com. We 
find that wine prices are strongly related to measures of reputation of the wine’s region in recent years. 
However, Parker points have a much more important effect on price. In addition, changes in Parker points 
lead to strong price changes, indicating that many buyers find these ratings to be valuable information in 
assessing the quality of wine. Finally, we showed that these price effects of changes in points are much 
stronger for higher quality wines than for lower quality wines. Apparently quality measures matter more 
at the high end of the market. 
We also showed some interesting trends in wine pricing. Wine prices have become more strongly 
related to both reputation and Parker points over time. These strongly suggest that quality indicators are 
becoming more important with globalization. In future work, we plan to understand better the dynamics 
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NM e a n s . d . M i n M a x
Age 9407 2.7 1.2 1 24
Points 9408 88.9 4.0 64 100
lag(Points) 3882 88.6 4.0 64 100
Price 9410 48.8 62.8 2 1295
lag(Price) 3882 50.6 65.1 8 1295










N 9408 9410 9407 9405







































Intercept ‐5.37*** (0.72) ‐18.40*** (0.93) ‐32.41*** (1.66)
ln(Points) 1.82*** (0.16) 4.82*** (0.21) 7.95*** (0.37)
Age 0.042* (0.022) ‐0.023 (0.018) 0.08*** (0.02)
Age² 0.006** (0.003) 0.010*** (0.002) ‐0.0003 (0.001)
N 3922 4039 1447






Intercept ‐0.21*** (0.05) ‐0.07 (0.06) ‐0.32*** (0.11)
Δln(Points) 0.54*** (0.14) 0.91*** (0.19) 3.10*** (0.38)
Age 0.07** (0.03) ‐0.03 (0.03) 0.15*** (0.05)
Age² ‐0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.005) ‐0.02*** (0.005)
N 1235 1896 751









1992‐1995 1.73*** (0.18) 3.24*** (0.36) 7.86*** (0.57)
1996‐1999 2.35*** (0.29) 4.37*** (0.48) 9.36*** (0.85)
2000‐2006 3.60*** (0.36) 7.31*** (0.30) 11.13*** (0.71)
Dep. var. = ln(Price)
Reputation
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